

Beginning in 1659 and intensifying through the first decades of the eighteenth century, Native peoples and Spaniards living in the broad region of the greater Spanish Florida experienced a reign of terror originating in the English colonies to the north that was pivotal in what would become the almost complete geographical and social reorganization of the entire region. The direct and indirect impact of European contact spread across much of this region because of early Spanish exploration, colonization, and missionization. However, the juggernaut sparked by English colonists in Virginia and the Carolinas ultimately provoked transformations that were far more rapid and substantial than might ever have been the case in the context of an expanding Spanish colonial system alone. In retrospect the English traders and Natives far to the north bear greater responsibility for the wholesale transformation of the lower Southern landscape by the early eighteenth century than did the Spaniards in St. Augustine, whose antiquity and proximity were initially unrivaled by English advances that postdated the Spanish presence by several generations.

The source of this reign of terror was the Indian slave trade, which began its direct push southward in western Virginia in the 1650s and reached its zenith in South Carolina after the 1670s.¹ Intersocietal warfare and the enslavement of captives on at least a small scale were endemic in the late prehistoric South long before European contact. The English introduced two new forces that would ultimately shatter the fragile and already-damaged social fabric of the seventeenth-century South: a vast and expanding commercial market for slaves and ample supplies of the

perfect tool to ensnare both slaves and slavers, the flintlock musket. During the space of just over half a century, the English funneled firearms and munitions into the hands of a few pivotal allied Native groups. These groups in turn terrorized the many people without firearms across greater Spanish Florida. They ultimately reached as far as the very walls of Spanish St. Augustine and even deep into the southern portion of the Florida peninsula. Using their newfound military might, Indian slave raiders killed as many as were necessary and captured as many as were possible. The captives were destined for transport and sale to English traders along the Virginia and Carolina frontier, who in turn shipped Florida Indian slaves to the Caribbean and other destinations.

In broad view the slave trade reaped both economic and political benefits for the English colonies, for in sponsoring Indian raids against Spanish mission Indians, the power and extent of Spanish Florida was diminished and eventually devastated. The intricately organized and delicately balanced colonial system encompassing dozens of previously disparate Indian chiefdoms under the overarching paramountcy of Spanish St. Augustine was swept almost completely away by the effects of increasingly aggressive slave raids, compounded by ongoing population declines due principally to epidemic depopulation.² From a far-flung mission system encompassing more than twenty-five thousand Indians in the mid-seventeenth century, Spanish Florida by 1706 was reduced to a handful of refugee missions with just over four hundred Indians huddled around the terrorized residents of St. Augustine. Subsequent raids pushed unconverted (and hence unprotected) south Florida Indians to the Keys, and many ultimately fled to Cuba in 1711 and were followed irregularly by others as late as 1760.

St. Augustine survived another half century, but it did so primarily as an isolated coastal colonial outpost surrounded by a devastated mission zone well over one hundred miles in radius on all sides. The remainder of Spanish Florida was quickly exploited as hunting grounds and eventually even resettled by the very Indians who had terrorized the region for decades and later by the English themselves to the north in what eventually became Georgia. By the 1715 Yamasee War greater Spanish Florida had

become a hostile wasteland traversed by armed slave raiders in search of anyone they could find to counter increasing debts to English traders.

The Indian slave trade was self-limiting and dwindled in importance after the near total devastation of all unarmed groups across the South. When all potential victims were either dead, gone, or themselves armed, English firearms were increasingly turned toward the burgeoning deer population. Prowess in hunting slaves was equally advantageous in the deerskin trade. Whether the victims were Indians or deer, commercial hunting had become entrenched as the lifestyle of survival for the groups that remained after the chaotic decades of the slave trade. Not only had the entire social geography of Spanish Florida been violently reformulated through the devastation and extinction of many groups, but also the survivors — the slave-raiders themselves — had largely been transformed from sedentary agriculturalists who hunted on the side to highly mobile commercial hunters who farmed on the side. The slave trade did not result solely in a reduction of population and a physical reshuffling of the social landscape; it also wrought more fundamental changes in the very fabric of social organization among the remaining groups.

Origins of the Slave Trade in Greater Spanish Florida

The beginning of the Southern Indian slave trade can be dated to the late 1650s, when a mobile and armed band of Erie Indians originally from the town known by the French as Rigue arrived in western Virginia near the falls of the James River. This group, known as Riquerrons, had been routed by the Onondaga in January 1656 and fled their palisaded town when they ran out of ammunition for their guns. Following initial skirmishes that same year, expansionist Virginia traders quickly established trade relations with the Riquerrons (or Richahecrians), who subsequently pushed far to the south in search of Indian slaves along the frontiers of Spanish Florida.³

These Eries were not the first immigrants from the far northern hinterland beyond Spanish Florida, but they were evidently the first to possess firearms. Further, they seem to have been the first to be linked directly to the commercial slave trade. During the early 1620s an unrelated group called the Chisca migrated from their original homeland in southwestern

Virginia far to the south and into Spanish Florida.⁴ Probably representing the first domino effect of the Iroquois Wars in the South to enter Spanish Florida, the refugee Chiscas seem to have maintained a sort of “parasitic” existence in and along the margins of the Spanish mission system, initially settling along the St. Johns River Valley in central Florida before being expelled for insurrection and general troublemaking in 1650. They ultimately settled in the northwest Florida panhandle, where they remained a thorn in the side of Spanish Florida for decades to come. Documentary accounts explicitly indicate they captured their first firearm shortly before 1676 from the Richahecrians themselves and thus were almost certainly not involved as raiders in the English slave trade prior to that point. The Chiscas were more victims than participants in the earliest English-sponsored slaving along the deepest Florida frontier.

The arrival of the Richahecrians was a very different affair altogether. In 1659 fugitives from the interior began to arrive in Spanish Florida with horrific stories of Northern raiders with painted faces and English firearms, characteristics that earned them the designation Chichimecos by Spanish Floridians, referring to the group that ravaged northern New Spain during the previous century.⁵ In 1661 these immigrant Erie slavers made their first direct assault against the Guale mission province in coastal Georgia, and additional raids in 1662 along the northern Guale frontier may have coincided with the establishment of a primary base of operations along the Savannah River. In direct consequence, by no later than the following year, a new confederacy called the Yamasees seems to have emerged among refugees from destroyed chiefdoms in central Georgia and perhaps elsewhere.⁶ By the late 1660s the Yamasees and other groups along the lower South Carolina coast had fled south into the Mocama mission province, receiving Spanish protection in exchange for participation in the annual *repartimiento* labor draft. When Charles Town was established in 1670, the northern Florida missions were already in a state of contraction, aggregation, and outright retreat in the face of Richahecrian slave raids.

Yet another name was bestowed on the Eries at Augusta by the early Carolina settlers, and this name — Westo — has survived the test of time to become the preferred denomination for the immigrant Eries from Rigue.

In 1674 Carolina pioneer Henry Woodward established formal contact with these Virginia-based slavers who had previously dominated Carolina's western and southern frontier. Three years later, Woodward's trade was formalized, though strictly controlled by the proprietary Carolina government. With this new Carolina connection the Westos continued to ravage the Spanish mission frontier, additionally pushing many unwitting groups along the Carolina frontier into English alliances.⁷ By spring 1680 all mainland missions along Florida's northern frontier had been relocated east or south to the barrier islands in defense against the Westo slavers. Nevertheless, not long after an aggressive and successful Westo-led slave raid on the Guale capital, an independent group of Carolina traders called the Goose Creek Men along with Henry Woodward and the proprietary government launched their own campaign to eliminate the Westos' stranglehold on the slave trade and used a group of immigrant Shawnees called the Savannah to wage war against the Westos. By May 1681 fugitive Westos were reported to Spanish authorities to be flooding into Coweta along the western frontier, and English reports two years later suggested that not fifty Westos remained alive, scattered and virtually powerless.⁸ Within a few short years Westo power had been destroyed, ending their two-decade monopoly on the Southern Indian slave trade. The damage was done, however, and the remnants of Spanish Guale and Mocama were easily swept away by successive pirate raids in 1683 and 1684. The Yamasees fled the failed Spanish protection, aggregating with other groups in the deep interior. Within the space of twenty-three years the entire coastline of present-day Georgia was wholly depopulated, in large part due to the effectiveness of the Westos in the early Indian slave trade.⁹

Yamasee and Creek Slaving

After a brief interval dominated by the Savannah replacements for the Westos, two pivotal events in 1685 combined to usher in the next phase of the Indian slave trade. First, after the 1684 establishment of a short-lived Scottish colony along the southern Carolina frontier at Stuart's Town, the bulk of the Yamasees who had fled to the interior in 1683 returned to the South Carolina coast, allying themselves with the Scots to initiate a bold

new slave raid into the heart of the Florida mission territory.¹⁰ The 1685 Yamasee raid on the Timucuan mission of Santa Catalina de Afuyca was a benchmark, marking the entry of the once-allied Yamasees into the slave raids against Spanish Florida. Later that same year, Henry Woodward embarked on a mission to establish formal trade relations with confederated towns of the powerful Apalachicola province in western Georgia, later to be known as the Uchises by the Spanish and the Lower Creeks by the English.¹¹ By August, Woodward had used Yamasee allies to make successful contact with the Apalachicola, and within short order at least two stockades were constructed in the northern reaches of the province to house the English and their trade goods.¹²

Spanish retaliation to both these Carolina advances resulted only in minor retreats of various Indians into areas of effective English control and evidently only hardened the resolve of the Creek and Yamasee slavers. Two successive expeditions by Spanish provincial lieutenant Antonio Matheos to Apalachicola in the fall and winter of 1685 only resulted in the burning of four unrepentant towns, and the 1689 construction of a Spanish fort near an Apalachicola town eventually provoked just two years later a wholesale migration of all the Creek towns eastward to the Ocmulgee River where English trade continued unabated.¹³ To the east, following two successive Spanish retaliatory raids in the fall and winter of 1686 in which Stuart's Town was destroyed, the Yamasees moved north and inland from the barrier islands of Georgia and South Carolina, ultimately settling just inland from Port Royal.

From these new bases the Yamasees and Lower Creeks waged an effective campaign of terror against Spanish Florida. Over the next few years more aggressive raids pushed deeper and deeper into Spanish territory, eventually bringing the Spanish mission system to its knees. Though small-scale raiding appears to have been increasingly common during this period, it was the full-scale assaults against major population centers that sparked prominent mention in the ethnohistorical record. In 1691 a combined force of Yamasee and Creek warriors attacked mission San Juan de Guacara along the modern Suwannee River, killing or capturing many of the town's Timucuan residents and burning the town itself. San Juan

was never reestablished, and two of its nearest neighboring missions soon relocated westward toward the garrisoned Apalachee province, leaving a vast gap in the western chain of Spanish missions.¹⁴

The pace of raiding against Spanish Florida increased significantly beginning in 1702 as slaving for the first time became a component of outright warfare waged by Carolina against Florida at the outbreak of Queen Anne's War. In May a one-hundred-man force of Creek warriors descended upon the Timucua mission Santa Fé, nearly destroying the mission and returning with many prisoners and scalps.¹⁵ A Spanish lieutenant was subsequently killed on his horse as he chased the raiders with a small Timucuan force. In the early fall a larger force of four hundred Creeks, Chiscas, Westos, and others under the leadership of three English officers set out from Hitchiti town in middle Georgia to invade the Apalachee missions, and on the same day some eight hundred Apalachees, Chacatos, and Timucuanes set out northward under Spanish leadership to exact revenge on the Creeks. The two forces met along the lower Flint River, and during what was subsequently known as the Battle of the Blankets (the Creeks laid a trap by arranging blankets to feign sleep as a lure for the Spanish-allied forces), the Spanish forces were completely routed, with the loss of perhaps three hundred who were killed or captured and some two hundred who deserted and fled on foot.¹⁶

Later that same fall South Carolina Governor James Moore launched a massive invasion of eastern Spanish Florida, using some five hundred Yamasee and Creek warriors who accompanied the English land-based force in a two-pronged assault that reached to the very walls of the Castillo de San Marcos itself. The entire remnants of the Guale and Mocama mission provinces were overrun, pushing Florida's northeastern boundary even farther to the south. This siege was followed just over a year later by yet another ambitious series of raids, this time against Florida's westernmost missions in Apalachee. In 1704, accompanied by more than one thousand Creek warriors and a force of fifty Englishmen, Moore and his Indian allies completely decimated the province, killing hundreds, enslaving more than a thousand, and forcing over two thousand into exile. Some fourteen villages were reduced to ashes, and the entire province was

abandoned. Shortly after the Spanish evacuation, the remaining western-most Timucuan missions were similarly destroyed, and despite regrouping and additional defenses the eastern Timucuan missions, after repeated attacks, finally withdrew between August 1705 and May 1706.¹⁷

By summer 1706 what had been a total mission population of sixty-five hundred Indians a quarter century earlier had been reduced to just over four hundred refugees huddled in and around St. Augustine, leaving the western border effectively unoccupied and undefended.¹⁸ While many of the more than six thousand lost during this time were undoubtedly victims of disease or had voluntarily entered exile outside the formal bounds of Spanish Florida, a substantial portion of this number were victims of the slave raids carried out in large part by Yamasees and Creeks operating out of Georgia and South Carolina. And this number does not include the many thousands captured or killed in the unconverted regions in the southern Florida peninsula during the subsequent few years.

The western mission chain of Spanish Florida had stood as a bulwark against the worst hostilities of the slave raiding through the last decade of the seventeenth century, but even when gaps in the Camino Real (the road that connected the line of missions across present-day north Florida) were opened up as missions were relocated for protection, the presence of the Apalachee and Timucua missions still provided a magnet to confine slave raids to northern Florida. There is no evidence of any substantial penetration of the southern Florida peninsula until the 1704 decimation of Apalachee. From that point on, south Florida increasingly became a target for slaving. The long-lived policy of isolationism and resistance under which the Calusa and other unconverted south Florida chiefdoms had lived for so many decades as neighbors of Spanish Florida ultimately proved to be their downfall in the context of English-sponsored slaving from the far North. What had successfully kept the forces of Spanish colonialism at bay for nearly two centuries also ensured that these groups possessed neither the firearms to defend themselves nor the political relationships to garner Spanish support and protection. Backed by Spanish troops, Florida's mission Indians withstood the onslaught of English-sponsored slave raiding for nearly half a century between 1659 and 1706, but the unallied Indians of south Florida

were almost wholly decimated during the seven years between 1704 and 1711. What had withstood nearly two centuries of European presence was annihilated in less than a decade.

Enslaving South Florida and the Yamasee War

With the 1704–06 collapse of the western mission chain, peninsular Spanish Florida lay completely open and utterly vulnerable for continued raids by armed bands of Yamasees and Creeks, who rapidly plunged deep into the heart of south Florida. Spanish documents are largely silent as to the details of this newest wave of attacks, though subsequent accounts indicate that as early as 1704, the chief of Cayo Hueso, or Key West, was granted permission to immigrate with his people as refugees from such raids to Cuba. The Florida governor later lamented in 1715 that he had been unable to prevent the coastline of Carlos and the rest of south Florida from being overrun three years earlier and had only been able to save those in the immediate environs of St. Augustine.¹⁹

Details of one memorable slave raid that probably took place during these first few years after the collapse of the missions were recorded by Carolina Indian trader Thomas Nairne and subsequently published posthumously. Accompanying a band of thirty-three Yamasee raiders on an expedition upriver and south along the then-unguarded St. Johns River, the party disembarked and traveled overland through the central Florida Lake District and deep into south Florida, ultimately capturing some thirty-five slaves before being counterattacked by thirty-three Indian warriors armed only with spears, all of whom were killed.

In a letter accompanying a newly drawn map of the Southern borderlands as early as 1708, Nairne reported that the Florida peninsula had been largely depopulated of its Native inhabitants, noting that the Yamasees at that time were “now obliged to goe down as farr on the point of Florida as the firm land will permit.” He noted that “they have drove the Floridians to the Islands of the Cape, have brought in and sold many hundreds of them, and dayly now continue that trade so that in some few years thay’le reduce these barbarians to a farr less number.”²⁰ Nairne’s comment that the south Florida Indians had been driven beyond the reach of dry land, past the Everglades, and into the Florida Keys is confirmed by details of

the 1720 Moll map on which his earlier Yamasee raid was also reported. The map shows “many villages” located in the southeastern tip of the Florida peninsula, confirming subsequent evidence regarding the retreat of these surviving refugees.²¹

During the rampages of 1704–11 the surviving south Florida Indians seem to have fled largely in two directions: south to Miami and the Keys and north to St. Augustine. Both areas ultimately became safe havens for refugees. As late as 1707 only five mission towns were listed at St. Augustine, and all were comprised of refugee Guales, Timucuan, and Apalachees from the northern mission territories. But in a 1711 census a total of eight towns were recorded, including one town consisting of more than a hundred Ais and other coastal south Florida Indians.²² Many more refugees from the rest of south Florida congregated in the southeastern corner of the peninsula and the Keys where they were protected from the land-based raiders. By 1711 this refugee band included the chief of the Calusa and most or all other neighboring chiefs and many of their surviving vassals, many of whom ultimately requested permission to immigrate to Cuba.

This migration was not without precedent, for Cuban and Spanish records reveal the sporadic presence of south Florida Indians in and around Havana from as early as 1688, with their numbers increasing through the 1690s.²³ By the time of the devastating raids that pushed the Calusa and other south Florida Indians to the Keys, Havana seems to have been familiar territory. In the spring of 1711 a Franciscan friar visiting Key West baptized the dying Calusa chief, who requested transport for his vassals to Cuba. Soon thereafter, a Spanish vessel returned and picked up some two hundred and seventy Indians, including fifty vassals of the Calusa chief, as well as two hundred and twenty other Indians including the chiefs of Jove, Miami, Tancha, Muspa, and Rioseco (or Jeaga). The Calusa chief, who was actively engaged in distant warfare with the Yamasees upon the boat's arrival, sent his brother-in-law the Great Captain and evidently came to Havana later to be baptized as Phelipe V. Nevertheless, after being settled together at the bluff called La Cabaña overlooking the bay, within a few months he along with three other chiefs and up to two hundred Indians perished from rampant epidemics of typhus and

smallpox. The survivors were divided up among private citizens around Havana, while others were evidently sent inland, with only sixteen or eighteen ultimately returning to their homeland in Florida.²⁴

The depopulation of most of south Florida by Yamasee and Creek raiders between 1704 and 1711 and the resultant flight of survivors either north to St. Augustine or south to the Keys resulted in a substantial falloff in the number of available slaves in the Carolina market, a condition that reached crisis proportions in 1712 and 1713.²⁵ Based on the firsthand testimony of the Indians themselves, it was precisely the depopulation and final evacuation of south Florida that precipitated this abrupt drop in supply. And it was the subsequent threats of Carolina traders against heavily indebted Yamasees that ultimately sparked the 1715 Yamasee War, which radically changed the political and economic landscape of the South. As related by Lower Creek war chief Yfallaquisca, otherwise known as Perro Bravo (Brave Dog), in his May 1715 meeting with the governor of Florida,

the causes that moved them to this were many, but . . . two years ago, when the English saw that now the Indians did not bring them any more Indian prisoners of those that they captured in these parts [Florida], razing the land, whom they went to search for by order of the English along the southern coast, in the provinces of Jororo and Mayaca, of these [Spanish] dominions, in order with these prisoners to continue paying the English for the guns, powder, balls, cutlasses, pistols, cassocks, hats, and other valuables which were given to them in credit, and bottles of firewater, the English told them that if they failed to pay them in slaves, they would take payment by making slaves of the debtors themselves, and their children and wives, and carry them off for sale to other places . . . they resolved to send secret messages to all the provinces about the damages that the English wished to do them, taking away their children and wives as slaves because now they could not find Indian slaves to take along the southern coasts, and that they should be prepared to make war on the English everywhere in case they should place this in execution.²⁶

In a very real way, just as the thousands of residents of the Florida missions effectively served as a fundamental component of the glutted market for Indian slaves around the turn of the eighteenth century, the final devastation of south Florida's remaining indigenous populations by

about 1712 marked the abrupt end of this short-lived boom-and-bust slave market. This was particularly the case for the Yamasee slavers of coastal South Carolina, who by that time were effectively boxed-in by other slaving societies with continuing access to remaining native populations in the midcontinental region. While greater Spanish Florida had fueled rapid and substantial success for Yamasee slavers between 1685 and 1712, the abrupt void left by its wholesale depopulation left the Yamasees in a state of overwhelming debt.

The overt pressure exerted by English traders over the next few years, combined with several provocative steps taken by English authorities during this period (including a census of allied native populations), resulted in a widespread rebellion that shattered the status quo as of 1715. Not only did this result in the flight of most of the Yamasees to find refuge in St. Augustine among their former victims and the gradual repopulation of the devastated western mission provinces by Creeks and remaining Yamasees alike, but it also shifted the overall dynamic of the Indian slave trade, which never recovered its former strength.²⁷ Carolina's burgeoning slave economy was irrevocably altered. Before 1715 the Carolina colony exported more slaves than it imported — mostly Indians — while in the aftermath of the Yamasee War, the maximum number of African slaves imported annually jumped more than one thousand percent within just over a decade, rising from one hundred and seventy or less between 1706 and 1716 to as many as seventeen hundred to twenty-four hundred during the late 1720s and 1730s.²⁸ Also transformed was the role of the commercial slave hunters, whose firearms were increasingly turned to the artificially expanded deer population resulting from the almost total removal of normal human predation in many depopulated regions. The exploitation and eventual exhaustion of the vast pool of Indian slaves captured from Spanish Florida between 1659 and 1715 thus played a pivotal role in setting the stage for an entirely new American South, one that would never again be the same either for European colonists or remaining Southern Indians.

The difference between the pre-Indian and the post-Indian slave trade in the South cannot be measured merely in terms of the number of people

or groups victimized, destroyed, or relocated as a result of half a century of slave raiding by the Westos, Yamasees, Creeks, and others. Slavers experienced tremendous and ultimately irrevocable cultural changes. To be sure, the introduction and spread of a vast commercial trade in manufactured goods provided by the English had its effect on the slave raiders as primary consumers of these materials. Historical and archaeological evidence make it abundantly clear that all such groups assimilated a wide range of European goods into their daily lives, from tools and weapons to cloth and jewelry. Yet trade goods were neither the primary cause nor the primary result of change during the slave-trade years.

As I have argued elsewhere, it was a far more fundamental shift in production on a local scale that resulted in such extensive cultural transformations among the slave raiders who ultimately survived this turbulent era.²⁹ Specifically, the introduction of the two elements mentioned above—firearms and a commercial demand for slaves—fostered the emergence of a small number of warlike groups that specialized in commercial slave raiding and hunting. It was the strategic funneling of flintlock muskets to selected groups that paved the way for the emergence of a new social order. Firearms provided unparalleled military might in the seventeenth- and early eighteenth-century South, especially when concentrated in the hands of a few strategically positioned groups who were in a position to provide ready access to abundant sources of Indian slaves, particularly along the Spanish mission frontier.

Nevertheless, the adoption of English guns by these groups resulted in an immediate and near total dependency on English traders for ready supplies of gunpowder and shot. Thus these groups were linked to the expanding network of English commerce. Because Indian slaves were the preferred and most valuable commodities that could be provided by these guns, slave raiding quickly became the primary productive activity of these interior groups, rapidly supplanting agricultural production as a means of providing for security and political and economic well being.

Aggregate chiefdoms that had probably been just on the verge of reestablishing a more traditional chiefly agricultural economy after more than a century of disruptions in the deep frontier were suddenly transformed into commercial hunters working as primary producers on the

far colonial periphery of northern Europe. Farmers who supplemented their staple crops with secondary hunting found themselves drawn into a new economic system in which warfare and hunting were primary and in which farming was only secondary.

This is not to say that the reduction in agricultural production had anything to do with the prolonged absence of males on slaving expeditions, especially since women likely played a substantial role in farming activities at many stages in the agricultural cycle. Instead, in a world in which commercial slaving and hunting took increasing priority over agricultural surpluses in defining indigenous political power and socioeconomic status, the totality of farming activities shifted from a central role to a more peripheral one. Surplus production was now directed toward communal slave raids and individual hunting, and surplus agricultural productivity probably dropped off to a minimum. Chiefs whose hereditary power was based principally on the management of human labor on lands owned by the chiefly lineage were devalued as primary productivity took place farther and farther from chiefly territories and under far less centralized control. The agricultural chiefdoms were now supplanted by new social formations such as the coalescent societies described in this volume. Chiefs who had always been at the center of a very small world were now thrust onto the periphery of a colonial world centered in Europe.

All these changes amounted to a fundamental transformation in the cultural landscape of the South, paralleling comparable changes in Europe and elsewhere, all ultimately leading to the development of the world we see today. It is no coincidence that virtually all of the major second-generation slave-raiding groups are still in existence, and all of their initial victims are essentially extinct. The Creeks, combined with absorbed remnants of the Westos and the Yamasees, were and are the survivors of this turbulent era in which virtually all their neighbors—the Guales, the Mocamas, the Timucuans, the Apalachees, the Calusas, and many others—are but distant memories now relegated to the domain of historians and archaeologists.

In the final analysis the Southern Indian slave trade seems aptly characterized as a powerful shock wave radiating out from the English colonies

along the middle Atlantic coastline, one which was a catalyst for rapid and far-reaching changes throughout greater Spanish Florida. In this sense Spanish Florida formed an important component of what has been characterized as a colonial shatter zone resulting from the introduction of and competition for commercial trade along a colonial frontier.³⁰ This shock wave emanating from Virginia and South Carolina almost literally swept away most of mid-seventeenth-century Spanish Florida, including all of its surrounding mission provinces and many adjacent groups and virtually all groups to the south. No surviving groups remained unchanged, including victims and aggressors. And while many colonial transformations occurred both before and after the passage of this particular shock wave, I doubt that many can compare to the speed and power of the Indian slave trade in terms of its effect on the residents — Indian, European, and African alike — of greater Spanish Florida.

Notes

1. For example, see Gallay, *Indian Slave Trade*.
2. For a synthetic overview of the Spanish colonial system in Florida, see Worth, *Timucuan Chiefdoms*.
3. Hahn, "Invention of the Creek Nation," 63–66; Hahn, *Invention of the Creek Nation, 1670–1763*, 17; Bowne, "Rise and Fall"; and Bowne, *Westo Indians*, 37–53. See also Fox, this volume; and Meyers, this volume.
4. Worth, *Timucuan Chiefdoms*, 2:18–21, 34–35, 208n48; Worth, "Spanish Missions," 47, 281–82n27; Hann, "Florida's Terra Incognita"; Hann, "Visitations and Revolts," 31–75; and Galloway, Jeter, Waselkov, Worth, and Goddard, "Small Tribes," 176–77.
5. Worth, *Struggle for the Georgia Coast*, 15–20.
6. Worth, "Yamasee Origins"; Worth, "Yamasee"; and Worth "Struggle for the Georgia Coast."
7. Worth, *Struggle for the Georgia Coast*, 26–27; and Bowne, "Rise and Fall," 69–70.
8. Crane, *Southern Frontier* (2004) 19–21; Worth, *Struggle for the Georgia Coast*, 30–34; Hahn, "Invention of the Creek Nation," 102–4; Hahn, *Invention of the Creek Nation*, 34–35; and Bowne, "Rise and Fall," 70–73.
9. Worth, *Struggle for the Georgia Coast*, 47–50. See also Bowne, this volume; Meyers, this volume; Fox, this volume; and Jennings, this volume.

10. Worth, *Struggle for the Georgia Coast*, 42–47; Worth, *Timucuan Chiefdoms*, 2:40–41; and Hann, *History of the Timucua*, 272–74.

11. Crane, *Southern Frontier* (2004) 33–36; Hahn, “Invention of the Creek Nation,” 116–19; and Hahn, *Invention of the Creek Nation*, 6, 49–52.

12. Hahn, “Invention of the Creek Nation,” 129–35; and Hahn, *Invention of the Creek Nation*, 40–47.

13. Crane, *Southern Frontier* (2004) 35–36; Hahn, “Invention of the Creek Nation,” 119–56; Hahn, *Invention of the Creek Nation*, 49–52; and Worth, “Lower Creeks,” 278–86.

14. Worth, *Timucuan Chiefdoms*, 2:42–43, 141–42; and Hann, *History of the Timucua*, 265–66.

15. Hann, *History of the Timucua*, 293–94; Worth, *Timucuan Chiefdoms*, 2:144; and Hahn, *Invention of the Creek Nation*, 60–61.

16. Francisco Romo de Uriza to Governor of Florida, Letter Regarding the Expedition against the Creeks, October 22, 1702, AGI, 858; Manuel Solana to Governor of Florida, Letter Regarding the Expedition against the Creeks, October 22, 1702, AGI, 858; Swanton, *Early History*, 120–21; Crane, *Southern Frontier* (2004) 74; Hahn, “Invention of the Creek Nation,” 198–203; and Hahn, *Invention of the Creek Nation*, 62–63.

17. Worth, *Timucuan Chiefdoms*, 2:145–46; Hann, *Apalachee*, 60–62, 264–317, 385–397; and Arnade, *Siege of St. Augustine*.

18. Worth, *Timucuan Chiefdoms*, 2:147–49.

19. Francisco de Corcoles y Martínez to Spanish Crown, Letter Regarding the Arrival of the Yamasees, July 5, 1715, AGI, 843; and Hann, *Missions to the Calusa*, 402–3.

20. Thomas Nairne to Lords Proprietors, Letter Regarding the Indians of Carolina, July 10, 1708, Sainsbury, *Records in the British Public Records Office*, 7:193–202.

21. Herman Moll, “A New Map of the North Parts of America Claimed by France,” 1720, HL.

22. Worth, *Timucuan Chiefdoms*, 2:147–49.

23. For example, see Worth, “History.”

24. Juan Francisco de Guëmes y Horcasitas to Spanish Crown, Letter Regarding the Keys Indian Mission, July 26, 1743, AGI, 860; Joseph María Monaco and Joseph Xavier Alaña, Report to the Governor of Havana Regarding the Proposed Mission to the Keys Indians (unpublished translation by R. W. Childers in possession of the author), 1742, AGN, Jesuitas III-17; Gerónimo Valdés, Autos Regarding

the Transport of Indians from Carlos, Coletto, and the Keys to Havana, March 5–April 18, 1711, AGI, 860.

25. Hahn, *Invention of the Creek Nation*, 74–80.

26. Francisco de Corcoles y Martinez, Francisco Menéndez Márquez, and Salvador García de Villegas, Autos Regarding the Arrival of the Yamasees, May 28–29, 1715, AGI, 843.

27. Hann, “St. Augustine’s Fallout”; Hann, *History of the Timucua*, 306–11; Worth, *Timucuan Chiefdoms*, 2:149–50; and Worth, “Yamasee,” 252.

28. Galloway, *Indian Slave Trade*, 299, 346.

29. Worth, “Spanish Missions”; and Worth, “Bridging Prehistory and History.”

30. Wolf, *Europe and the People Without History*; and Ethridge, “Creating the Shatter Zone.”